Michigan Law Review
Volume 46

Issue 7

1948

THE BILL OF RIGHTS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
SUPREME COURT
John Raeburn Green
Member of St. Louis (Missouri) bar

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court of
the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
John R. Green, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT, 46
MICH. L. REV. 869 (1948).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol46/iss7/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Vol. 46

MAY, 1948

No. 7

THE BILL OF RIGHTS, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT*
John Raeburn Green t

THE
:first enforcement of any of the First Amendment freedoms
against the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, was in
1927.1 In the twenty years since, these freedoms have, one by one, been
brought within the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as integral parts of the "liberty" which is safeguarded
against state denial-the process having been completed in 1947 by
the dictum that the prohibition of the establishment of religion ran
against the states.2 The chronology of the struggle to enforce the Bill of
Rights against the states, as well as other circumstances, suggests that
the progress may not have been unrelated to the advance of federal
power over the individual and its progressive exclusion of state power
as the latter also attempted to advance. Both the advances and the
rising tide of liberty were set in motion by the same fundamental causeour transformation into an industrial society-and in particular by the
development ( still continuing) of transportation and communication.
A study of the judicial process as revealed in the opinions of the
Supreme Court of the United States relating to the enforcement of the
guaranties of the Bill of Rights against the states must therefore deal

*

This article is part of a paper prepared for the volume of essays to be published
in honor of Professor Max Radin. It deals with the decisions through November, 1947.
I have drawn upon three papers entitled "Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment," in which the decisions through the 1943 term are considered on the merits:
27 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 497 (1942), for the period to 1942; 28 WASH. UNIV, L.Q.
251 (1943), for the 1942 term; and 43 MicH. L. REV. 437 (1944) for the 1943
term.
I am indebted to Milton I. Goldstein, Esq., of the Saint Louis Bar, for great help
in the revision of this paper.
A.B., Westminster College; LL.B., Harvard University. Member of St. Louis
(Missouri) bar.-Ed.
1
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 47 S.Ct. 655 (1927). This was also the first
successful invocation in the Court of any of the guaranties of the First Amendment
against either a state or the United States.
2
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947).
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largely with recent decisions. This miniature mirror, which compensates for its size by its bright contemporary lighting, reflects the culmination of a struggle which commenced with the adoption of the Constitution; and the greatest intensity of the conflict is displayed in the decisions
of the last eight years, which were made by a court in the main newly
constituted and scarcely equalled in the past for its vigor. The climax
was reached in three decisions of the last day of the I 946 term of the
Court.8
The sections following deal with the rights of one accused or convicted of crime.

I
THE POWER OF THE DICTUM: PALKO

v.

CONNECTICUT

The extent to which the decisions now enforcing liberty against the
~ates rest upon obiter dicta is extraordinary. The expansion of "liberty''
to include freedom of speech and of th·e press has consistently been
founded on the ambiguous dictum in Gitlow v. New Y ork.4 The clear
and present danger rule, which in applying these freedoms has so
greatly enlarged them, is still being rested upon Mr. Justice Holmes'
dictum in Schenck v. United States.5 The application of clear and
present danger to the free· exercise of religion at this moment rests
only upon a dictum. 6 The line of cases which commenced with Thornhill v. Alabama/ protecting picketing as free speech, rests upon Mr.
Justice Brandeis' dictum in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union.8
There is also observable the impressive influence of the dicta in the
Slaughter-House Cases,9 in the decisions dealing with these rights
under the privileges or immunities clause. It is as if the Court, while
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947); Gayes v. ' New
York, 332 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1711 (1947); and Foster and Payne v. Illinois, 332
U.S. 134, 67 S.Ct. 1716 (1947).
.
4
"For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and
of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by
Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."
268 U.S. 652 at 666, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925).
5
249 U.S.-47 at 52, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919).
6
ln West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 639, 63 S.Ct.
I I 78 ( I 943). The statement there was obiter because the holding was not based on the
free exercise of religion.
7
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
8
301 U.S. 468 at 478, 57 S.Ct. 857 (1937).
9
16 Wall. {83 U.S.) 36 (1873).
3
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conscious of the need tor the expansion and wider application of liberty, was yet reluctant to take a new step forward without some color
of precedent-either the dicta or the dissenting opinions of earlier,
and bolder, Justices.
Whether Mr. Justice Cardozo had the power of the dictum in
mind, when in I937 he delivered the opinion of the Court in Palko v.
Connecticut,1° cannot be ascertained.11 What is certain is that if he had
been determined to turn back the rising tide of liberty in respect to the
rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions, he could hardly have
done it more effectively than by this opinion. The facts were simple.
The appellant was tried for murder in the first degree, found guilty of
murder in the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. Under a statute permitting the state to appeal upon any question of law,
the state appealed; the judgment was reversed; and on new trial
appellant was convicted of murder in the :first degree and sentenced
to death. He contended (I) that this was the double jeopardy prohibited by the Fifth Amendment and ( 2) that the right against double
Jeopardy embodied in the Fifth Amendment was protected against
the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 It
would seem that here it was necessary for the Court to decide at least
one of these two questions, and if either was answered in the affirmative, to decide the other also. But Mr. Justice Cardozo was careful
to refrain from deciding ei~her that the statute did not subject the
accused to the double jeopardy J?rohibited by the Fifth Amendment,18
or that a state might subject an accused to such double jeopardy.14
Either or both disclaimers may have been inserted to obtain the concurrence of. other Justices, for this was an eight-to-one opinion; 15 and
10

302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937). This was the last opinion he delivered in

person.
11 He had earlier said: "I own that it is a good deal of a mystery to me how judges,
of all persons in the world, should put their faith in dicta.>' THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 29 (1921).
12
He contended also that the right was protected by the privileges or immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice Cardozo disposed of this in a single
sentence: "Maxwell v. Dow gives all the answer that is necessary." 302 U.S. 319 at
329, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937).
18
Id. at 322: "We do not find it profitable to mark the precise limits of the
prohibition of double jeopardy in federal prosecutions."
14
Id. at 328: ''What the answer would have to be if the state were permitted
after a trial free from error to try the accused over again or to bring another case against
him, we have no occasion to consider."
·
16
Mr. Justice Butler dissented without opinion.

872,
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its tenor was sharply counter to the opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland,
for a unanimous Court, in Grosjean cv. American Press Co.,16 only the
previous year.
All that the case decided was that Palko must die, for the "kind of
double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him" was not "a
hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it"; it
did not violate "fundamental principles of liberty and justice." Mr.
Justice Cardozo supported this by- arguing that since in Kepner cv.
United States 17 four Justices (Holmes, White, McKenna and Brown)
had dissented from the holding that a second trial at the government's
instance was forbidden by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment, "right-minded men could reasonably believe that in
espousing that conclusion they were not favoring a practice repugnant
to the conscience of mankind." While this was said of the dissent
of four Justices, it would seem to apply almost equally to-the dissent
of one. The effect of this is perhaps to extend the philosophy developed by Mr. Justice Holmes in the liberty of contract cases ( and
carried on by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the flag salute cases later) 18
that legislation must be upheld if a reasonable man could have done
what the legislature did. We have "right-minded" instead of "reason- ·
able" and we have no explicit reference to the legislature; but if the
argument is carried to its logical conclusion, it must mean that whenever
a single Justice dissents, the legislation must be upheld, his dissent being in itself sufficient evidence of the reasonableness of the legislative action. To extend the doctrine in this way would, of course, vitiate
the Bill of Rights, for in effect it would give a veto to a single Justice
in the application of the due process clause to protect any of the rights
of the accused 19 against legislative invasion- and perhaps judicial
invasion also.
What must, more than the decision, detain us is the vast array of
dicta in which Mr. Justice Cardozo indulged. The appellant's thesis,
he said, was that whatever would be a violation of the Bill of Rights
if done by the federal government was now equally unlawful by force
of the Fourteenth Amendment.if done by a state. Mr. Justice Cardozo
16
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444 (1936). The
contrast (at 243-244) with the dicta of the Palko opinion is striking.
17
195 U.S. 100, 24 S.Ct. 797 (1904).
18
See his opinion for the Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 3 IO U.S.
586, 60 S.Ct. JOJO (1940), and in particular his dissenting opinion in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. I 178 ( 1943).
19
It is not clear, but apparently Mr. Justice Cardozo did not intend to apply this
test to legislation invading the First Amendment freedoms.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

denied this general rule and undertook to draw a line, placing on one
side those "privileges and immunities" which "have been found to be
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states." If the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed these, he said, "the process of absorption has had its source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed." On this side of the line he placed
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and free exercise of religion,2°
the right of peacable assembly, and the right of one accused of crime to
the benefit of counsel.21 These the Fourteenth Amendment "may"
make it unlawful for a state to abridge. 22 He conceded also that the
thought that condemnation shall be rendered only after trial was
fundamental "in the concept of due process," and that the trial must
be a real one, not a sham or pretense. This, he said, was the reason
why it had been heid 23 that the right to the "aid of counsel" 24 was
protected, that decision turning upon the fact that "in the particular
situation laid before us in the evidence the benefit of counsel was
essential to the substance of a hearing."
On the other side of the line, Mr. Justice Cardozo placed the
right to trial by jury in criminal prosecutions, guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, and the immunity from prosecution except after a grand
jury indictment, guaranteed (in the case of "capital, or otherwise
infamous crime") by the Fifth. These, he said, "may have value and
importance," but they are "not of the very essence of a scheme df or. dered liberty," and to abolish them would not violate a "'principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.'" What was true of them was true also of the
immuntty against compulsory self-incrimination, guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment-"this too might be lost; and justice still be done."
Arguing that "compulsory self-incrimination is part of the established
procedure in the law of Continental Europe'' 25 ( and that "double
20
This was three years in advance of the first holding to that effect, Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
21
302 U.S. 319 at 324-327, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937).
22
Id. at 3 24.
23
The reference was to Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932).
24
He apparently intended to distinguish between the right to representation by
counsei, with its corollaries, and the right to appointment of counsel for an indigent
accused.
25
Mr. Justice Cardozo might well have looked twice at this argument, for even
in 1937 it was evident that the totalitarian states-notably Russia and Germanywere depending largely on compelled self-incrimination in their administration of
what may euphemistically be called criminal justice.
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jeopardy, too, is not everywhere forbidden"), he observed-and not
with disapproval-that "today as in the past there are students of our
penal system who look upon the immunity [against self-incrimination]
as a mischief rather than a benefit and who would limit its scope or
destroy it altogether." "Justice," he added, "would not perish if the
accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry," although
"no doubt there would remain the need to give protection against
torture, physical or mental." 26 He implied that the prohibition of the
Fourth Amendment against unlawful searches and seizures,21 and
"other provisions of the Sixth," were to be treated in the same way. 28
While the opinion supported the exclusion of these rights by authority, the cases cited 20 were in r937 no longer authoritative, for
there has since occurred the expansion of liberty made by the Gitlow case in r925. The contention which Mr. Justice Cardozo was
considering was that double jeopardy was now prohibited by the due
process clause, and the most recent successors of the Gitlow decision
were expressly relied on by the appellant. 30 Mr. Justice Cardozo might
as well have catalogued the limits of the commerce power on the basis
26

302 U.S. 319 at 325-326, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937).

27

In the New York Court of Appeals he had held that evidence illegally obtained,

without a search warrant, was admissible. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E.
585 (1926).
28
302 U.S. 319 at 324, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937).
29
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111, 292 (1884) and Gaines v.
Washington, 277 U.S. 81 at 86, 48 S.Ct. 468 (1928) on grand jury indictment;
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908) on self-incrimination;
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 2o~S.Ct. 448, 494 (1900), on trial by jury in criminal cases; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 at 398, 34 S.Ct. 341 ( 1914) on
the Fourth Amendment; and West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 24 S.Ct. 650 (1904)
on "other provisions of the Sixth." The only case later than 1925 is the Gaines case,
decided less than a year after the first holding which enforced the Gitlow dictum.
There the Court in a single sentence said that for a state to provide prosecution by
information instead of iridictment was "not a violation of the Federal Constitution"
(citing the Hurtado case); but at the same time said (at 85-86): "It is contended,
however, that due process of law exacted in the Fourteenth Amendment in causes tried
in state courts must be construed as equivalent to the Sixth Amendment in Federal
trials. The question has not arisen in any case cited to us. • • • But we need not
pass on that question now." As to Hurtado v. California, only the year before the
Palko opinion, Mr. Justice Sutherland, for a unanimous Court, had said that the Court
had "held that in the light of subsequent decisions the sweeping language of the
Hurtado case could not be accepted without qualification." Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 243, 56 S.Ct. 444 (1936). Mr. Justice Cardozo had
concurred in this opinion.
so Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 243, 56 S.Ct. 444 (1936);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 at 65-68, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1931); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). See summary of brief in 82 L. Ed. 288-289.
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of the decisions of r 890. And these superannuated decisions had not
considered these rights with respect to their inclusion in "liberty," but
solely with respect to their protection as "privileges or immunities,"
or as included in historical due process. For either of these grounds of
protection there was indeed much to be said, as is shown by Mr.
Justice Harlan's powerful and prophetic dissents,81 which time is now
vindicating; but they did not present the question before the Court in
the Palko case.
·
No reader of the Palko opinion would suppose that the validity of
these rights against the states, so categorically and so briefly denied
by Mr. Justice Cardozo, had from the days of the Slaughter-House
Cases 32 troubled and divided the Court, as indeed the problem is to
this day troubling and dividing it, more than ever before. Nor could it
be discovered from this opinion that the struggle over protection of
these rights was simply the latest phase of a century-old conflict, in
which, since the Gitlow decision, the prospect of success for the advocates of protection had become much greater. Mr. Charles Warren
had at the time observed of that case, that if the Gitlow doctrine was
"carried to its logical and inevitable conclusion, every one of the rights
contained in the Bill of Rights ought to be and must be included in
'liberty,'" and thus guaranteed by the due process clause against state
denial, for their claim to inclusion at least equalled that of freedom of
speech. He had pointed out that as a matter of fact, of history and of
law, freedom of speech was not "in any degree as 'fundamental' as most
of the other rights recited in the Bill of Rights," since, prior to the
First Amendment, "while no state had in its Bill of Rights a declaration of right to freedom of speech, practically every state had a declaration of right to freedom of religion, of right to keep and bear arms,
of right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and of right
to jury trial." 88
81
See his vigorous dissenting opinions in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
at 538, 4 S.Ct. II 1, 292 (1884); in Twining v. New Jersey, 2II U.S. 78 at 114,
29 S.Ct. 14 (1908) (where he suggested that the privilege against self-incrimination
was, in addition, a part of liberty); and in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 at 605,
20 S.Ct. 448, 494 (1900). In West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 24 S.Ct. 650
(1904), where the Court discussed, but did not decide, whether the right to confrontation with witnesses was a part of due process, he dissented without opinion. Mr.
Justice Harlan was not a member of the Court when the other two cases relied on by
Mr. Justice Cardozo were decided.
82
16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873).
88 Warren, "The New 'Liberty' under the Fourteenth Amendment," 39 HARV.
L. REV. 431 at 460-461 (1926). Cf. PowELL, THE SUPREME CoURT AND STATE
PoucE PoWER, I 922-30, p. 52 ( I 93 2) : "It is no longer worth ,while to spend time in
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The propositions advanced by Mr. Justice Cardozo on the strength
of these authorities were obiter pure and simple, for they were not
answers to the questions (which after all concerned only double jeopardy) before the Court for decision-but not decided. The essence of
this belletristic essay, which gave the scantiest consideration to profoundly important matters, was that the rights of the accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights were nice things to have, no doubt, but
luxuries, not necessities. They were all lesser rights, without the faw,
unless in the particular case the evidence convinced a majority of the
Court that they were "essential to the substance of a hearing''-that
burden Mr. Justice Cardozo placed o'n the accused in every case. Jove
was never more omniscient.
In this deliberate fashion Mr. Justice Cardozo went out of his way
to crush to earth all libertarian heresy. This opinion was the foundation for the turning of the Fair Trial Rule against the rights of the
accused. How great the di:fference was between protecting a right
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights because it was a fundamental right,
and protecting it only when "in the particular situation ... in the evidence" a majority of the Court considered it to have been fundamental
to the particular defendan~, was to be demonstrated in the future.

II
TRUTH AND JUSTICE: BETTS

v.

BRADY

The protection of the rights of the accused against state invasion
had perhaps made more progress since I 92 5 than might have been
inferred from the Palko opinion. Two of the rights guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment-the rights to notice of the nature and cause of the
accusation, and to trial by an impartial tribunal-had from an early
qate been recognized to be essential parts of procedural due process.sso.
Of a third such right, that of confrontation with witnesses, Mr. Justice
Cardozo, for the :five-to-four majority, had said in Snyder v. Massachusetts,84 in 1934, that "for present purposes, we assume that the
considering whether there are liberties not within the assumed contemplation of the
official progenitors of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cf. also Brown, "Due Process of
Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court," 40 HARV. L. REV. 943 at 950 (1927):
"The fact is that the cases tend to establish Mr. Justice Harlan's statement in his
dissent in Taylor v. Becklwm, [178 U.S. 548 (1900) ], that the words [life, liberty or
property] . . . 'should be interpreted as embracing every right that may be brought
within judicial cognizance.'"
saa See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 at 389-390, 18 S.Ct. 383 (1898).
84
291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330 (1934). His opinion here was consistent with the
Palko opinion, although not so elaborate.
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privilege is re-enforced by the Fourteenth Amendment, though this
has not been squarely held." But Mr. Justice Roberts (in whose
dissenting opinion Justices Brandeis, Sutherland and Butler joined)
had replied sharply: "It is not a matter of assumption but a certainty
that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the observance of'' this
right. 85 The dissenters protested that the Court ought not "to convert
the inquiry from one as to the denial of the right into one as to the
prejudice suffered by the denial," that "to pivot affirmance on the
question of the amount of harm done the accused is to beg the constitutional question involved." 86 Mr. Justice Cardozo's avoidance of
this right in his Palko catalogue will be noted.
In r936, in Brown v. Mississippi,31 a unanimous Court held that
the use of a confession extorted by brutality and violence was a denial
of due process, remarking, however, that "the privilege against selfincrimination is not here involved." But, notwithstanding Palko, the
doctrine of this case was in r 940- I 942 carried much beyond "torture,
physical or mental." In Chambers v. Florida ss it was held that the
use of a confession obtained by questioning over a period of five days
was a denial of due process. From that it was but a short step 39 to
Lisenba v. California,4° where Mr. Justice Roberts said (for the Court,
but as dictum) that "the concept of due process would void a trial in
which, by threats or promises ... a defendant was induced to testify
against himself." This did not sound far removed, if removed at all,
from the privilege against self-incrimination.
In r932, in Powell v. Alabama,41 Mr. Justice Sutherland, for the
seven-to-two majority, had held that the right to have "the assistance of counsel," guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, was protected
against state denial. The convictions set aside here were of negroes,
sentenced to death for rape. The Court did not speak of the right as
part of liberty, but rather as an essential part of procedural due process.
It based the decision, however, in part upon the enlargement of liberty
85

Id. at 131.
Id. at 136.
37
297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936). Mr. Justice Cardozo referred to this in
the Palko opinion.
38
309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472 (1940).
39
The intervening cases were Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629, 60 S.Ct. 612
(1940); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 60 S.Ct. 1032 (1940); Lomax v. Texas,
313 U.S. 544, 61 S.Ct. 956 (1941), and Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547, 61 S.Ct.
1092 (1941).
.
40
314 U.S. 219 at 237, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941).
41
287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1942).
86
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to include freedom of speech and of the press; and Mr. Justice Cardozo's statement in Palko five years later that here the right to counsel
had "been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" was
essentially true.
At the same time the Court had been engaged in developing the
Fair Trial Rule. This had its origin in expressions in cases where a
trial, although superficially conforming to due process, was simply a
mask for a conviction due to mob violence, to public passion or to perjured testimony.42 In 1941, in_Smith v. 0'Grady 48 the Court held that
a conviction on a plea of guilty, made because of a promise of leniency
which was not performed by an ignorant and bewildered layman without counsel and without knowledge of the charge, was lacking in due
process, and later that year Mr. Justice Roberts stated the rule:
"As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the
failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very
concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we 'must find
that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts
complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a
fair trial." 44
As originally applied, the rule took nothing away from the rights of
the accused, nor did it add to them-it simply required that due process
be accorded in fact, as well as in form. "Due process" must always have
meant real due process, not merely its simulation. It is true that in
1941-1942 45 the rule seemed to be developing to an extent which
threatened to place upon the Court a burden it could hardly support.
But even then it seemed that the Court was attempting to work out,
laboriously and piecemeal, its own bill of rights for criminal prosecutions. In the confessions cases, indeed, the Court seemed not only to be
arriving at the same result as the privilege against self-incrimination
would produce,46 but even to be formulating a rule which in terms
resembled the privilege. While it was not clear why the Court need
· undertake in this fashion to discard Madison's Bill of Rights and prepare its own, the progress in the confessions cases gave ground for hope
42
See Mr. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309 at 345, 35 S.Ct. 582 (1915); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 4f S.Ct. 265
(1923); and Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. I03, 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935).
48
312 U.S. 329, 61 S.Ct. 572 (1941).
44
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 at 236, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941).
45 See Lisenba v. California, and Hysler v. ~orida, 315 U.S. 411, 62 S.Ct.
688 (1942).
46
13ram v. U'nited States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183 (1897).
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that what would finally emerge would not be much different. And
there the crystallizing process seemed to be progressing rapidly. 47
This was the situation when in r942 Betts v. Brady 48 for the first
time turned the Fair Trial Rule against the rights of the accused. In
the Powell case ten years earlier the Court had held ( r) that the hearing required by due process historically 49 and in practice had "always
included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by
the party asserting the right"; and ( 2) that, assuming the defendant's
inability to employ counsel "even if opportunity had been given,"
under the circumstances "the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process." The Court said
that the United States by statute and every state in the Union required
a trial judge to appoint counsel for an accused who was unable to employ counsel ( although in a few states this was limited to "the more
serious crimes" or to capital cases), and that a rule so unanimously
adopted "reflects if it does not establish" the "inherent" and "fundamental" right to appointment of counsel, "at least in cases like the
present." The court then said:
"Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions,
or under other circumstances, we need not determine. All that
it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital
case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as
a necessary requisite of due process of law...•" 50
It will be observed that notwithstanding the disclaimer of the first
sentence, the second sentence announces a rule of general application.
Upon this whole opinion its author, Mr. Justice Sutherland, had
41
The process is illustrated in Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 at 555, 62 S.Ct.
1139 (1942), where the Court said that it had set aside convictions "based upon confessions extorted from ignorant persons who have been subjected to persistent and
protracted questioning, or who have been threatened with mob violence, or who have
been unlawfully held incommunicado without advice of friends or counsel, or who
have been taken at night to lonely and isolated places for questioning. Any one of these
grounds would be sufficient cause for reversal. . . • The use of a confession obtained
under such circumstances is a denial of due process. . • ."
48
316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942).
49
See Radin, "The Myth of Magna Carta," 60 HARV. L. REv. 1060 at 1088
(1947).
ro 287 U.S. 45 at 71, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932).
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placed a broader gloss. Four years later in the Grosjean case 51 he
had said that in the Powell case, "we concluded" that certain rights
guaranteed hY, the Bill of Rights were protected against the states by
the due process clause, "and among them the fundamental right of the
accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution." '_The Palko
opinion, as has been seen, dealt with the right to counsel with some
ambiguity; but twice thereafter the Court had again used broad language with respect to the right; ·52 and in one of these cases, Johnson v.
Zerbst,58 in 1938, it had now held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the "Assistance of Counsel" required in federal prosecutions the
appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant, unless there was an
intelligent and competent waiver of the right.
But now Mr. Justice Roberts, for the six-to-three-majority in Betts
v. Brady, took a different view of the Powell case. The petitioner, a
penniless farmhand of little education, accused of robbery, had asked
the Maryland court to appoint counsel for him. The court refusing, he
defended himself as best he could, was (not surprisingly) convicted,
and sentenced to-eight years in prison. Mr. Justice Roberts admitted
that "expressions in the opinions of this court lend color to the argument" that "in every case, whatever the circumstances, one charged
with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel, must be furnished counsel
by the State." 64 Rejecting this, he pointed out that in each of those
cases a state statute had required the appointment of counsel, while
here it did not; that historically and at present there was a great
diversity in the states with respect to the appointment of counsel; and
that from this it was demonstrated that ''the considered judgment of
the people, their representatives and their courts" was "that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." 55
He added, quoting from the opinion of the Maryland court of appeals,
that the petitioner's contention would make no distinction between
criminal charges of different magnitude and that presumably it would
be argued "'that trials in the Traffic Court would require it;'" 56 "As51
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 243-244, 56 S.Ct. 444
(1936).
62
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 at 462, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938); Avery v.
Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 at 447, 60 S.Ct. 321 (1940).
58
304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938).
54
316 U.S. 455 at 4-62-463, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942). He referred to the
Powell and Avery cases and to Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 61 S.Ct. 572 (1941).
55
316 U.S. 455 at 471.
56
Id. at 473.
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serted denial" of due process, he said, "is to be tested by an appraisal
of the totality of facts in a given case," for "that which may, in one
setting, c9nstitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light
of other considerations, fall short of such denial." 57 The Fourteenth
Amendment, he concluded, "prohibits the conviction ..• of one whose
trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
right," but "we cannot say that the Amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial of any offense, or in any court, can be
fairly conducted," 118 without representation by counsel.
While the Court here was influenced by the "all or none" argument, it seemed to rely chiefly upon the Fair Trial Rule, as well as the
fact that the state statute here did not require the appointment. The
state statute could not, of course, be relevant in determining the fairness of the trial.59 Mr. Justice Roberts here was as tenacious to condition the right to appointment of counsel on the amount of harm done
the accused by its denial, as in Snyder v. Massachusetts 60 he had been
to refuse to condition the right to confrontation with witnesses on the
"amount of harm done the accused" by that denial. But he did not
make clear how the right of confronting the witnesses, however
"fund~mental" it was, could be of its full value to a defendant who
lacked counsel to cross-examine them.
In the Betts case Mr. Justice Black (with whom Justices Douglas
and Murphy joined) dissented, saying that it would be "a little like
mockery to secure to a pauper the solemn constitutional guaranties for
a fair and full trial . . ., and yet say to him, when on trial, that he
must employ his own counsel, who could alone render these guaranties
of any real permanent value to him." 61 He observed that even under
"the prevailing view of due process, . . ." reflected in Mr. Justice
Roberts' opinion, which gives "this Court such vast supervisory powers that I am not prepared to accept it without grave doubts," the
judgment should be reversed. And he added: "I believe that the
Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth applicable to the states. But
this view, although often urged in dissents, has never been accepted by
57
Id. at 462.
5s Id. at 473.
59
Except as a basis for comparison with other trials in the same state, which is
by no means what the Fair Trial Rule had meant.
60

291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330 (1934).
316 U.S. 455 at 476, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942), quoting Carpenter v. Dane
County, 9 Wis. 274 at 276-277 (1859).
61
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a majority of this Court and is not accepted today." 62 This passage
( citing the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment as disclosed by the
debates in Congress) heralded the revival in I 947 of the struggle over
the application of the privileges or immunities clause, which had divided the Court from the Slaughter-House Cases in 1873 until the
death of Mr. Justice Harlan in 19u.
In the Snyder case, Mr. Justice Roberts had said that "where the
· conduct of a trial is involved, the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment is not· that a just result shall have been obtained, but that the
result, whatever it be, shall be reached in a fair way." 63 He did not
repeat this now, where it would have had much application. The due
· process clause does not guarantee justice because it cannot; it is not that
justice is unattainable, but that it is unascertainable. Even when exact
justice is attained, we cannot know that for certain. Justice depends first
upon full knowledge of the facts; but truth lies at the bottom of a well,
even in a trial court. There is the fact, now well-known, that all witnesses suffer to greater or less extent from errors of observation and
of memory, permitting them to testify with complete sincerity to what
did not happen. There is of course perjury. There is often the reluctance of both parties to place on the stand the one witness who is in
a position to know the truth. An agreed statement of facts in a civil case
is frequently, if not usually, a compromise acceptable to both parties,
the result of bargaining, and for that reason not containing the whole
truth. In the same way a. plea of guilty is the result of bargainingthough the bargaining is often not at arm's length-and even when
the defendant is represented by counsel, it may be m~re or less than the
foundation for justice. It was Bacon, not St. John, who described
· Pilate (a judge of some years' experience) as "jesting'' when he asked,
"What is truth?" 64
In an appellate court, with a record so artificial, the well where
truth lies has of course become much deeper. 65 How often have the
62
316 U.S. 455 at 475, 474, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942). In 1940 in Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 at 235, note 8, 60 S.Ct. 472 (1940), he had said: "There
has been a current of opinion-which this court has declined to adopt in many previous
cases-that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make secure against State
invasion all the rights, privileges and immunities protected • . • by the Bill of Rights"
(citing_ Mr. Justice Harlan's dissents).
68
291 U.S. 97 at 137, 54 S.Ct. 330 (1934).
64
Cf. John 18:38 with Bacon's Essay on Truth. As to Pilate's experience see
,RADIN, THE TRIAL OF JESUS OF NAZARETH 176-208 (1931).
5
il See Judge Lamm in Creamer v. Bivert, 214 Mo. 473 at 479-480, II3 S.W.
n 18 ( 1908): "Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in
a printed abstract in a court of last resort. She oft hides in nooks and crannies visible
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parties and counsel read an appellate court's statement of the facts in
their case with surprise, sometimes indeed astonishment! If the whole
truth and nothing but the truth could be before a Court, justice would
still have to contend with the fallibility of mortals, but the condition
cannot be often met.
Since it is evident that the prerequisite of justice, knowledge of the
truth in its full integrity, will with difficulty be available to a court, it
becomes all the more necessary that courts approach it as closely as possible, by exhausting to the utmost the possibilities of the method of
ascertaining truth to which we are committed. That is the adversary
system, which is itself a part of due process. We depend upon what is
resolved from the struggle of the parties, long experience having
caused us to believe that truth is more likely to emerge from this
struggle than from direct search. 66 The process cannot demand absolute
equality in the skill of counsel for the contending parties, but its success depends upon the equality of both parties in the possession of
counsel. In a criminal prosecution the accused, as was said in the
Powell case, "lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one;" and the judge
is limited ( more so in state courts than federal) in calling witnesses
not called by the parties, in suggesting objections, in commenting on
the credibility of witnesses, and generally in attempting to discover
the truth in avenues not opened by the parties-that is, by their counsel.67 If it is thought that an accused can present his case adequately
without counsel (as Mr. Justice Roberts apparently thought that Betts
could), consider what would happen in law enforcement if the state
were required to prosecute and try without counsel. If the state needs
counsel, the accused must need it at least as much, for the balance in
only to the mind's eye of the judge who tries the case. To him appears the furtive
glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, -the sincere or the flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the
scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. The
brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson or the
itching over-eagerness of the swift witness, as well as honest face of the truthful one,
are alone seen by him. In short, one witness may give testimony that reads in print,
here, as if, falling from the lips of an angel of light and yet not a soul who heard it,
nisi, believed a word of it; and another witness may testify so that it reads brokenly
and obscurely in print and yet there was that about the witness that carried conviction
of truth to every soul who heard him testify."
66 Even where the investigative system is used, in Continental Europe, it has
been recognized that "truth is more easily understood if it is approached from two
directions," and that the public interest requires counsel for both prosecution and
defense. CALAMANDREI, EULOGY OF JuoGES, Adams' and Phillips' trans., 54-55 (1942).
67 See 1 WrGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 374 (1940).
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a criminal prosecution is weighted in favor of the state, the presumption
of innocence being called in to redress that. However it may have been
earlier, in I947 no one can doubt the truth of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
observation that the accused "requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him." 68
Betts v. Brady failed to take these considerations into account.
While it seemed to ~eave the accused with a "fundamental" right to
confer with his counsel ( which could not be affected by whether or not
the Court thought that necessary for "fairness" in the particular case),
yet if he was without funds to employ counsel he might still be hurried to trial and conviction unless the lack of "fairness" was sufficiently
evident to shock "the universal sense of justice," as interpreted by a
majority of the Court hearing his appeal. Its greatest vice lay in the
substitution of subjective judgment, varying in each case, for the objective and inflexible requirement of the Bill of Rights.

III
NATURAL LAW AND LIBERTY: ADAMSON

v.

CALIFORNIA

While the storm did not break until r947, the four years after
Betts v. Brady showed that the winds were rising. 69 At the I943 term
the confessions rule was carried further in Ashcraft v. T ennessee,7°
where the Court, through Mr. Justice Black, held that the use of a confession obtained after thirty-six hours of continuous questioning, in
relays, was in violation of the due process clause ( even though a jury
had found that the confession was voluntary) because the situation was
"inherently coercive." n. Mr. Justice Jackson ( with whom Justices
Roberts and Frankfurter joined) dissented in an opinion of great
vigor. "The Constitution," he said, "requires that a conviction rest on
a fair trial," from which forced confessions are ruled out. Of course
questioning for thirty-six hours was "inherently coercive," but so was
68

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 at 69, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932).
The cases at the 1943, 1944 and 1945 terms are collected and analyzed in
Stockham, "Summary of Civil Liberties Cases in the 1943 Term of the Supreme
Court," 2 NAT. B.J. 95 (1944); "Summary of Civil Liberties Cases in the 1944 Term
of the Supreme Court of the United States," 3 NAT. B.J. 189 (1945); and "Summary of the C_ivil Liberties Cases in the 1945 Term of the Supreme Court of the
United States," 4 NAT. B.J. 287 (1946).
10
322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944).
11 Id. at 154. Id., note 9, Mr. Justice Black indicated the close approach of this
• line of cases to the privilege against self-incrimination.
69
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questioning for one hour, so was arrest itself. The Court, Mr. Justice
Jackson observed, does not quite say that the Constitution prohibits the
use of all confessions made after arrest, but "it is moving far and fast in
that direction." 72
But this progress was soon checked. In Lyons v. Oklahoma 78 the
Court, through Mr. Justice Reed, held that use of a second confession
obtained twelve hours after the accused had made a confession admittedly involuntary had not deprived the. accused of a fair trial, nor
denied due process.74 Mr. Justice Murphy (with whom Mr. Justice
Black concurred), dissenting, said:
"The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government
from convicting a defendant on evidence that he was compelled
to give against himself.... Decisions of this Court in effect have
held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes this prohibition
applicable to the states." 75
In Malinski v. New York, 76 the latest of the confessions cases,77 the
Court held, five-to-four, that a coerced confession, not introduced in
evidence but referred to by witnesses and the prosecutor, was in fact
"employed to obtain a conviction,'' which was a denial of due process.78
In the meantime the Fair Trial Rule had received further consideration from the Justices who had now become its chief proponents.
In 1943, in Buchalter v. New York, 19 Mr. Justice Roberts stated that
the due process clause required that state action be "consistent with the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice," but did not "draw to
72
Id. at 159, 161. He added: "The use of the due process clause to disable the
States in protection of society from crime is quite as dangerous and delicate a use of
federal judicial power as to use it to disable them from social or economic experimentation." Id at I 74.
·
78
322 U.S. 596, 64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944).
74
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the result. Mr. Justice Rutledge dissented
without opinion.
75
322 U.S. 596 at 605, 64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944). He cited Chambers v. Florida,
Canty v. Alabama, Lisenba v. California, and the Ashcraft case.
76
324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945).
77 Except that Ashcraft v. Tennessee came to the Court a second time in 327
U.S. 274, 66 S.Ct. 544 (1946), the state court, on new trial, having excluded the
confession but permitted witnesses to testify regarding it. The second conviction was
reversed without dissent.
78
For criticism of the "ambiguous language" and "inconsistencies in application
of a stated formula" in these cases, see Morgan, "The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945,"
59 HARv. L. REV. 481 at 538-541 (1946).
79
319 U.S. 427 at 429-430, 63 S.Ct. 1324 (1943).
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itself the provisions of state constitutions or state laws." This seemed
at variance with the distinction he had made in the Betts case as to
state statutes requiring appointment of counsel. In two cases so at the
I 944 term Mr. Justice Frankfurter had discussed the differencewhich indeed seemed fairly obvious-between the Court's review of
federal convictions under the Bill of Rights anq. its review of state
convictions under the Fair Trial Rule. In a concurring opinion in the
Malinski case he now made a defense of the rule, taking one small step
toward rendering it intelligible. Instead of "the universal sense of
justice," and similar expressions, he confined this phrase to "the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples." si Considering European
events, one could be thankful for this much. He added that the fact
that judges might differ among themselves whether in a particular
case a trial offends "accepted notions of justice" did not disprove "that
general rather than idiosyncratic standards were applied," "alert deference" to the state court's judgment being "an important safeguard
against such merely individual judgment." 82
•
But his chief defense of the Fair Trial Rule was a vigorous attack
on the concept that specific provisions 'of the Bill of Rights were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Bill of Rights was approached with Mr. Justice Cardozo's spirit: "Eighteenth-century statesmen" had formulated these safeguards, some of which ( right of trial
by a jury of twelve, and the requirement of grand-jury indictment)
"were built on experience of relative and limited validity," while others expressed fund:~mental principles of liberty and justice. But, said
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "we can hardly select one provision of. the
Bill of Rights and reject another," for this "leads inevitably to a
warped construction of specific provisions to bring within their scope
conduct clearly condemned by due process but not easily fitting into
the pigeon-holes of the specific provisions." And he revived the argument originally made in Hurtado v. California 88 ( to which the Court
so United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 at 68, 64 S.Ct. 896 (1944); Feldman
v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 at 490-491, 64 S.Ct. 1082 (1944).
81
324 U.S. 401 at 416-417, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945). The phrase was still a long
way from the point where it had started, "fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions," used (in construing a
state statute) in Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 at 316, 47 S.Ct. 103 (1926).
The phrase in the Hebert. opinion was taken verbatim from Hurtado v. California,
II0 U.S. 516 at 535, 4 S.Ct. III, 292 (1883), where it was used in the paragraph
of that opinion which the Court has since rejected (see note 84, infra). In the Hebert
opinion the Court did not mention the Hurtado case.
82
324 U.S. 401 at 417, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945).
88 110 U.S. 516 at 534-535, 4 S.Ct. III, 292 (1883).
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had given a definitive answer in the Powell and Grosjean cases 84 that
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment would be redundant
and meaningless if it included the rights specifically guaranteed elsewhere in the Bill of Rights; that the due process clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment must have the same meaning as in the Fifth; and that
therefore these rights could not be included in it.85
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Black had gone out of his way to
expand the '~grave doubts" regarding the rule which he had mentioned
in the Betts case. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington 86 he said:
"Superimposing the natural justice concept on the Constitution's specific prohibitions could operate as a drastic abridgment of democratic
safeguards they embody, such as freedom of speech, press and religion,
and the right to counsel. This has already happened [in] Betts v.
Brady. For application of this natural law concept, whether under the
terms 'reasonableness,' 'justice,' or 'fair play,' makes judges the supreme arbiters of the country's laws and practices...." In a footnote
he added that rights protected at a particular time only because the
Court, as then constituted, believed them to be "a requirement_ of
fundamental justice" might under the same rule be left unprotected
by another court, "with a different belief as to fundamental justice."
The further conflict over the right to appointment of counsel had
been less sharp. The first cases 87 after Betts v. Brady were Williams
v. Kaiser 88 and Tomkins v. Missouri, 89 at the 1944 term. There a
89

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 at 65-68, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932); Grq$jean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 at 243, 56 S.Ct. 444 (1936). Mr. Justice Roberts
also had dealt with it summarily in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 at 133-134,
54 S.Ct. 330 (1934). These answers cited the line of cases, commencing with
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 at 241, 17 S.Ct. 581 (1897),
which had held that the Fifth Amendment's explicit guarantee that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, was included in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth. They relied also on the protection of First Amendment rights by the due process clause. But long before these inclusions Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting in the Hurtado case, had made an answer equally effective in
principle. See 110 U.S. 516 at 547-550, 4 S.Ct. 111, 292 (1883).
85.Mr. Chief Justice Stone (with whom Justices Roberts, Reed and Jackson
joined), dissenting, said (324-U.S. 401 at 438, 65 S.Ct. 781): "We agree that
the controlling principles upon which this Court reviews on constitutional grounds
a state court conviction for crime, are as stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter."
86
326 U.S. 310 at 325-326, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945).
87 Except for Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1944), where it
was held that the petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies.
88
323 U.S. 471, 65 S.Ct. 363 (1945).
89
323 U.S. 485, 65 S.Ct. 370 (1945) •
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seven-to-two majority, through Mr. Justice Douglas, held that petitions for habeas corpus should not have been dismissed by the Missouri
court without a hearing. The petitioners had pleaded guilty, without
counsel, to robbery with a deadly weapon and to murder, respectively
-both capital offenses. Williams had been sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen years and Tomkins to life imprisonment. Williams
alleged that he had asked for counsel, but no appointment was made;
Tomkins alleged that he did not know of his right to counsel under the
state statute. The Court was careful to use the language of the Powell
case and to avoid that of the Betts case, pointing out that "a layman is
usually no match for the skilled prosecutor" and that this was a reason
why "the right to counsel is 'fundamental.'" Mr. Justice Frankfurter
(with whom Mr. Justice Roberts joined) dissented in both cases on
the ground that there appeared to be an adequate state ground for
dismissal of the petitions. In none of the opinions was any reference
made to Betts v. Brady, although the briefs had by no means been
silent regarding that case.
Other cases followed now in rapid sequence. House v. Mayo,8°
White v. Ragen,91 and Hawk v. Olson,92 dealt primarily with the denial
of opportunity to consult with counsel; but in the first two the per
curiam memoranda 93 nevertheless spoke of the right to appointment of
counsel, saying: "Compare Betts v. Brady with Williams v. Kaiser and
Tomkins v. Missouri." This cryptic remark was not explained. In the
Hawk case Mr. Justice Reed, holding, for a unanimous Court, that
there was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, cited the Williams and Tomkins cases, but not the Betts case. In Rice v. Olson,9"
petitioner had been convicted of burglary and sentenced to from one
to seven yea:rs. The offense seemed indistinguishable from that in the·
Betts case and the punishment was less; but Mr. Justice Black, for the
six-to-three majority, stressing the complexity of a question of jurisdiction arising from the petitioner's allegation that the offense had been
90

3z4 U.S. 4z, 65 S.Ct. 517 (1945).
3z4 U.S. 1 60, 65 S.Ct. 978 (1945).
92
3z6 U.S. z71, 66 S.Ct. n6 (1945).
98
In the House case Mr. Justice Roberts dissented from the holding that there
was a denial of due process. In the White case the petitions were dismissed on the
. theory that the State Court might have dismissed them upon the ground of state
procedure, Mr. Justice Roberts concurring in the result. In a footnote in the White case
the Court remarked that zz5 petitions for certiorari had in the last two terms been
filed to review denial by the Illinois Supreme Court of leave to file petitions for
habeas corpus.
94
•
3z4 U.S. 786, 65 S.Ct. 989 (1945).
91
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committed on an Indian Reservation, held that he was entitled to appointment of counsel unless there was an intelligent and understanding
waiver.95 The Williams and Tomkins cases were cited but Betts v.
Brady was not. In Canizio v. New York,9 6 Mr. Justice Black, for the
six-to-two majority, held that the petitioner had in fact had the benefit of counsel, while Justices Murphy and Rutledge, in separate dissenting opinions, appraised the circumstances differently. In Woods v.
Nierstheimer 97 the petitioner claimed use of a confession induced by
threats and beatings, plus an ineffective appointment of counsel, but
Mr. Justice Black, for a unanimous Court, dismissed tji.e petition on
the ground that the Illinois court's denial of habeas corpus had been
because that was not the proper remedy.
At the r946 term, in Carter v. Illinois,9 8 the Court, through Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, returned for the first time to the Fair Trial
language of the Betts case, dismissing the petition on the ground that
an intelligent waiver of counsel could be inferred. Mr. Justice Douglas
(with whom Justices Black and Rutledge joined), dissenting, and Mr.
Justice Murphy, dissenting separately, urged that "at least in a capital
case" it was the duty of the Court to appoint counsel whether requested
or not, if the accused was incapable of making his own defense, the
Williams case being the authority for this. A little later, in De Meerleer v. Michigan, 99 a per curiam memorandum reversed the denial of a
new trial to a seventeen-year old boy, who had on the same day been
arraigned, tried, convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, without being told of his right to counsel, nor of the consequences of his plea of guilty. This deprived him of "rights essential
to a fair hearing under the Federal Constitution," it was said.
With the exception of the Carter case, there had not been in any
of these cases a reaffirmance of the Fair Trial doctrine, and indeed
from some ·of them the inference seemed to be that the Betts case had
been substantially limited. Many of the opinions seem to be designed
with some care not to reopen the conflict in the Court. But that conflict
now broke out in Louisiana v. Resweber,100 which set the stage for the
95

The dissent of Justices Frankfurter, Roberts and Jackson urged only that the
Nebraska court's action should be regarded as a denial of habeas corpus on allowable
state grounds.
96
327 U.S. 82, 66 S.Ct. 452 (1946).
97
328 U.S. 211, 66 S.Ct. 996 (1946).
98
329 U.S. 173, 67 S.Ct. 216 (1946).
99
329 U.S. 663, 67 S.Ct. 596 (1947).
100
329 U.S. 459, 67 S.Ct. 374 (1947).
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decisions of June 23, 1947. Here a negro boy, convicted of murder,
was sentenced to electrocution. The executioner threw the switch, but
because of some mechanical difficulty death did not result. (There was
evidence that the current had reached the boy.) The petitioner claimed
that to proceed again with the electrocution woajd violate the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the double jeopardy
provision of the Fifth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth. There were three opinions, but no one
of them commanded a majority of the Court. Mr. Justice Reed (with
whom Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Black and Jackson joined)
examined the circumstances "under the assumption, but without so
deciding, that violation of the principles" of the Bill of Rights "as to
double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment, would be violative
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," adding ( on
the authority of Re Kemmler 101 ) that this clause would prohibit "execution by a state in a cruel manner." They considered that there was
no double jeopardy involved; while as to cruel and unusual punishment, it was said that the cruelty was the result of accident, and
further did not lie in the electrocution sought -to be prohibited but in
the first attempt. There was nothing here to suggest the application
of the Palko doctrine, the language being either favorable or neutral
as to the inclusion of the specific rights in the due process clause. This
may explain why Mr. Justice Black concurred in the opinion, but Mr.
Justice Frankfurter did not.
As the Palko opinion had made clear, the concept that the due
process clause restrained the states in their administration of justice
only when a violation of a "fundamental principle of justice" would
ensue-which has here been called (because of its origin and for convenience) the "Fair Trial Rule"-was not to be confined to the rights
of the accused at his trial, but extended as well to the provisions of the
Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring separately in the Resweber case, expanded the defense of this
concept which he had made in the Malinski case. He considered that
some of the safeguards of the Bill of Rights "have perduring validity,"
but "some grew out of transient experience or formulated remedies
which time might well improve." The Fourteenth Amendment, he
said, "did not mean to imprison-- the states into the limited experience
of the eighteenth century," but "did mean to withdraw" from them
"the right to act in ways that are offensive to a decent respect for the
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dignity of man, and heedless of his freedom." These, he admitted,
"are very broad terms by which to accommodate freedom and authority," and "as has been suggested from time to time, they may be too
large to serve as the basis for adjudication, in that they allow much
room for individual notions of policy." But that, he said, "is not our
concern," for "the duty of such adjudication on a basis no less narrow
has been committed to this Court." In the language of the Snyder
and Palko cases, he concluded that the execution, under these circumstances, was not "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." 102
Mr. Justice Burton (with whom Justices Murphy, Douglas and
Rutledge joined), in a dissenting opinion which had the appearance of
having been written in the first instance as the opinion of the Court,
considered that there was cruel and unusuai punishment here, and a
violation of "constitutional due process."
·
The climax of the struggle to enforce the rights of the accused
against the states was reached in three decisions on the last day of the
1946 term. Foster v. lllinois 108 and Gayes v. New York1° 4 both dealt
with the right to counsel. In the Foster case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
for the five-to-four majority, relying upon the Palko and Betts cases,
held that due process did not require a state court to offer counsel upon
a plea of guilty, the court having previously advised the defendant
of his "rights of Trial." In every case in which due process had been
found wanting, he said, "the prisoner sustained the burden of proving, or was prepared to prove but denied opportunity," that for lack of
counsel "an ingredient of unfairness actively operated" in his conviction. Mr. Justice Black (with whom Justices Douglas, Murphy and
Rutledge joined), dissenting, said that the Court now "waters down
the Bill of Rights guarant~e to counsel" so as "to make it compatible
with the Court's standards of decency and a fair trial," as it had the
same day (in the Adamson case discussed below) watered down the
privilege against self-incrimination. "We cannot know," he continued,
"what Bill of Rights provision will next be attenuated by the Court."
The Betts case was precedent for this decision, "but it is the kind of
precedent that I had hoped this Court would not perpetuate." Mr.
Justice Rutledge, speaking separately for the same dissenters, considered that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel was applicable
against the states, but that aside from that, even on the Court's "fair
102
The privileges or immunities clause (which does not appear to have been
before the Court) he dismissed on the authority of the earlier cases.
108
332 U.S. 134, 67 S.Ct. 1716 (1947).
104
332 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1711 (l947).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

trial" basis, there was a lack of due process. In the Gayes case the
Court divided in the same way as to the conviction as a second offender
of a boy who ~t sixteen had been convicted of burglary, having waived
counsel. The basis of the decision was that in his second trial he might
have contested whatever infirmity there was in the first sentence.105
In the third of these cases, Adamson v. California,106 the judicial
debate on the Fair Trial Rule and the Bill of Rights was extended and
frank. The appellant, convicted of murder, had claimed that permitting
the prosecutor to. comment on his failure to testify violated the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination which, he said, was
protected against state invasion by both the privileges or immunities
clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth. Through Mr.
Justice Reed, the Court said that it would assume, without deciding,
that what had occurred here would violate the privilege against selfincrimination,101 but that it was "settled law" that this privilege was
not protected by the privileges or immunities clause; and that the due
process clause, while it protected "the right to a fair trial," did not
"draw all the rights of the federal Bill of Rights under its protection."
To require-the accused to testify would not necessarily deprive him of
a fair trial and there was nothing "unfair" in permitting the prosecutor
to comment upon his silence.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring separately, confined his opinion to the due process clause.108 He further elaborated the views he
had expressed in the Malinski and Resweber cases, relying upon the
Palko case and Twining v. New Jersey 109 as Mr. Justice Reed had
done. The suggestion that some of the first eight amendments "express
the restricted views of .Eighteenth-Century England" was repeated,
and the right to grand-jury indictment, the right to trial by a jury of
twelve i.n criminal cases, and the Seventh Amendment were again
cited. If the due process clause was intended to incorporate the Bill
105
Mr. Justice Burton concurred in the result. Mr. Justice Rutledge, for the four
dissenters, pointed out that so far as appeared, Gayes had lacked counsel in his second
trial.
106

332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947).

107

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, conceded that this comment was barred,
in a federal prosecution, by the privilege, as it was also by act of Congress. Mr.
Justice Black, dissenting, said that the Court's opinion, while assuming that the privilege was a bar in federal prosecutions, "strongly implies" that it is not. He made the
same assumption as the Court.
108
He "put to one side" the privileges or immunities clause because of "the mischievous uses to which that clause would lend itself'' if its scope were not confined as
it had been by the decisions which had denied its application.
1

01)

211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908).
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of Rights, "it is a strange way of saying it." Indeed, he continued, that
suggestion "is not unambiguously urged"-what is urged is a "selective
incorporation"; 110 and "if the basis of selection is merely" the incorporation of those provisions "which commend themselves to individual
justices as indispensable to the dignity and happiness of a free man,
we are thrown back to a merely subjective test." But, he said, "the
judicial judgment in applying the Due Process Clause" must move
within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based
upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment." He once
more resurrected the discredited Hurtado doctrine of interpretation of
the due process clause,111 and suggested again that "alert deference" to
the judgment of the state court was "an important safeguard" in applying the Fair Trial Rule. The evidence adduced in Mr. Justice Black's
dissent regarding the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment he disposed of summarily.112
Mr. Justice Black (with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joined), dissenting, said that the decision reasserts the constitutional theory that the
Court "is endowed by the Constitution with boundless power under
'natural law' periodically to expand or contract constitutional standards to conform to the Court's conception of what at a particular time
constitutes 'civilized decency' and 'fundamental liberty and justice.'"
This theory at once degrades the safeguards of the Bill of Rights and
appropriates for the Court a broad power not authorized by the Constitution. The Twining case had been undercut by the confessions cases.
The purpose of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments had been to
confine judicial exercise of power "within precise boundaries." He
considered that "one of the chief objects" of the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to make the Bill of Rights applicable to
the states, which purpose "has never received full consideration or
exposition in any opinion of this Court. . . ." He referred to the
exclusion in Maxwell v. Dow 118 of the Senate debate with regard to the
purpose of the Amendment, and the fact that in the Twining case the
110
"Some are in and some are out, but we are left in the dark as to which are in
and which are out. Nor are we given the calculus for determining which go in and
which stay out."
111
See note 84, supra.
112
"Any evidence of design or purpose not contemporaneously known could hardly
have influenced those who ratified the Amendment. Remarks of a particular proponent of the Amendment, no matter how influential, are not to be deemed part of
the Amendment. What was submitted for ratification was his proposal, not his speech."
332 U.S. 46 at 64, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947).
118
176 U.S. 581, 20 S.Ct. 448, 494 (1900).
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question had been held to be "no longer open," although the Court
there admitted that its action resulted in giving" 'much less e:ffect to the
Fourteenth Amendment than some of the public men active in framing
it' had intended...." 114 Mr. Justice Black now brought before the Court,
in a lengthy appendix to his opinion, the committee reports and the
debates in Congress, indicating that the purpose of the privileges or
immunities clause was to enforce the first eight amendments against
the states. He renewed, in the strongest terms, his attack on the "natural-law-due-process" formula, which "subtly conveys to the courts, at
the expense of legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in fields
where no specific provision of the Constitution limits legislative power."
This had been rejected by a majority of the Court in the SlaughterHouse Cases, but subsequently the Court, departing from the Slaughter-House philosophy of judicial tolerance of state regulation of business activities, had used the due process clause to protect "property
rights under natural law concepts," and at the same time had contracted
the Amendment as a protection against state infringement of the Bill of
Rights. He could not consider the Bill of Rights to be "an outworn
eighteenth century 'strait jacket,'" for the evils which it was designed
to meet, though ancient, "have emerged from century to century
wherever excessive power is sought by the few at the expense of
the many."
If he had to choose, Mr. Justice Black said, "between the selective
process of the Palko decision applying some of the Bill of Rights to the
States," or applying none of them, he would choose the selective
process. But rather than accept either of these choices, he would
follow the purpose of the Amendment, "to extend to all the people of
the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights." 115 The possibility that the Court was now wise enough to improve upon it by
substituting ·natural law concepts he considered "entirely too speculative" to justify taking that course.
Mr. Justice Murphy (with whom Mr. Justice.Rutledge joined)
dissented separately, saying that "while in substantial agreement with
114
Tw,ining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 at 96-98, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908). He
quoted also from this opinion (at n3): "Much might be said in favor of the view
that the privilege [ against self-incrimination] was guaranteed against state impairment
as a privilege and immunity of National Citizenship, but . • . the decisions of this
court have foreclosed that view."
115
332 U.S. 46 at 69; 70, 72, 74, 75, 89, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947). However,
elsewhere he said: "Whether this Court ever will, or whether it now should, in the light
of past decisions, give full effect to what the Amendment was intended to accomplish is
not necessarily essential to a decision here." Id. at 75.
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the views of Mr. Justice Black, I have one reservation and one addition to make." He agreed that the Bill of Rights should be "carried
over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment," but
he would not limit the latter to the Bill of Rights "entirely and necessarily." There might be occasions where failure to conform to "fundamental standards of procedure" would "warrant constitutional condemnation . . . despite the absence of a specific provision in the ,Bill of
Rights." 116
,

IV
THE FouR ALTERNATIVES: FAIR TRIAL, PRIVILEGES OR
IMMUNITIES, DuE PROCESS AND LIBERTY

After a century and a half, the struggle to enforce the Bill of Rights
against the states has in I 947 come closer to complete victory than
ever before. The rights of the accused, while still largely outside the
shelter of the Fourteenth Amendment, nevertheless in the Adamson
case commanded four votes for inclusion in toto. It is even possible,
notwithstanding Mr. Justice Reed's expression there, that if the question had been compelled testimony (in the literal language of the
Fifth Amendment) instead of comment on failure to testify, the privilege against self-incrimination would have commanded a majority.
Many of these cases presented, not clear violations of the basic rights,
but violations of more or less necessary corollaries to them, corollaries
only lately-or sometimes not even, yet-recognized by the Court to be
included in the Bill of Rights' protection, and having a debatable right
to such inclusion. Thus the right to appointment of counsel was not
held to be protected by the Sixth Amendment until 1938,111 the privilege against self-incrimination has not yet been held to bar comment
on failure to testify,118 and the Palko opinion indicated doubt whether
the Court was there prepared to follow the single five-to-four decision
which had held that a second trial at the instance of the government
amounted to double jeopardy. The progress of the Court's thinking
might have been more rapid if the cases dealing with these rights had
116

332 U.S. 46 at 123-124, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938).
118
As 28 U.S.C. (1940) § 632 bars comment on the failure of an accused to
testify, in federal prosecutions, the Court has not needed to consider whether this
result would there be guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, without a statute. Similarly, the Court's delay until Johnson v. Zerbst, in holding that the Sixth Amendment
guaranteed the appointment of. counsel in federal prosecutions, was doubtless due to
the existence of 18 U.S.C. (1940) § 563, requiring the assignment of counsel in cases
of "treason, or other capital crime."
117
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involved unmistakable violations of the basic rights themselves. The
rapid progress which for a time was made in the confessions cases at
any ~ate suggests that conclusion.
The rule of "fairness," which we may perhaps still call the "Fair
Trial Rule," seems bound to undergo further consideration in the
Court. The Court has in the past considered its value to lie in permitting relief in a particular case where justice clearly required relief,
while at the same time ( as it supposed) riot opening the door to other
cases where justice might not be so demanding. At the time when
Betts v. Brady was decided, it was observed that the Fair Trial Rule
placed upon the Court a burden which it was hardly likely to be able to
sustain; that it "opens the door to arbitrary and purely subjective
judgment, unrestrained by any rule; it leaves all state courts uncertain ·
of their powers; and it deprives persons accused of crime of any assurance regarding their rights." 119 The experience of the five years since
seems to have fulfilled these misgivings. The purely administrative
burden which the rule has placed upon the Court has now so grown that
of the 1356 causes which came to the Court at the 1946 term, roughly
528, or 39 per cent, were petitions from state convicts. 120
119

Green, "Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 27 WAsH. UNIV. L.Q.
497 at 534 (1942).
120
A table supplied by the kindness of the Clerk of the Court shows the number
of in forma pauperis cases from. the 1930 term through the 1946 term, as follows:
Term
Number
Number
Filed
Granted
1930
22
3
1931
24
l
1932
38
4
1933
66
IO
1934
54
4
1935
59
8
1936
60
4
1937
97
15
1938
85
7
1939
117
18
1940
120
19
1941
178
16
1942
147
8
1943
214
12
1944
339
IO
1945
393
15
1946
528
8
The figures include federal as well as state cases, and include also a few state
cases arising under the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
but it is estimated that the number of federal and equal protection cases is less than
ten per cent, and that the state cases in which costs were paid would be sufficient to
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Two-fifths of the matters which come before the Court are now
reviews of state criminal convictions, the ratio increasing each year.
Since the Court ~y the terms of the Fair Trial Rule is bound to make
its own "independent examination of the record" in each case, it appears that the rule, if applied whole-heartedly, has placed on the Court
a burden which it can no longer sustain. Yet this burden will increase,
for it requires little acquaintance with inmates of the penitentiaries to
discover that almost every prisoner considers that there was something
"unfair" in his prosecution, conviction or punishment. The deluge has
not yet really begun, and there is nothing the Court can do to check it
(so long as it adheres to the Fair Trial Rule) except to refuse the applications without too much regard to their merits, thus defeating the
purpose of the rule. The great decrease in the number of in f orma
pauperis cases in which the Court took jurisdiction, set out in the
margin, suggests that the Court is beginning to realize this, the percentage having declined from more than 15 per cent at the 1937
term to 1.½ per cent at the 1946 term. And in the cases where the
Court did take jurisdiction, the attenuating process is suggested by the
increasing emphasis placed upon prior exhaustion of state remedies and
questions of state procedure, and the search (as in the Gayes and Foster
cases) to find in the record something which might be stretched into a
waiver of the right.
The rule has not only placed this insupportable burden upon the
Court, but it has deprived persons accused of crime of any assurance
regarding their rights, substituting instead a hope which is usually
shattered; and it has left state courts and prosecutors in uncertainty
regarding their powers and duties, to such an extent as already to be
the subject of complaint in state courts. 121 This is true of the confesmake these figures roughly accurate as a tabulation of all state cases involving review
of criminal convictions under the due process clause.
As early as the 1944 term the Court had commented on the great number of
petitions for certiorari filed to review denial by the Illinois Supreme Court of leave
to file habeas corpus petitions. See note 93, supra. At the 1946 term no less than
322 of the in forma pauperis cases came from Illinois, these dealing largely with the
right to counsel. The Illinois cases, even without adding to them the cases in which
the costs were paid, amounted to nearly one-fourth of the l 3 56 matters which came
before the Court at the last term.
,
121
See, e.g., Newman v. State, 148 Tex. Cr. App. 645 at 651-652, 187 S.W.
(2d) 559 (1945), where the Texas court said:
"As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice [ citing the Supreme Court
decisions].
" •.. There is no escape from the conclusion that the Supreme Court of the
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sions cases, but even more so of the right to counsel cases, where the
Court has most often used this rule. There the rule is by its terms in
most cases impossible for a trial court to apply. As the Court has often
said, the appointment, if it is to be effective, mµst be made at the very
outset of the trial, before the accused pleads. The trial court cannot
know at that time what the testjmony will disclose, nor what the accused's defenses on the evidence and on the law may be. It often will
have only the slightest knowledge of the extent of the accused's education, or of his familiarity or lack of it, with court procedure. But in
Betts v. Brady the Court said that all of these are essential elements
in the determination of whether or not the accused needs counsel in
order to make his defense adequately and thus to have a fair trial.
These are substantial objections to the "fair trial" doctrine, but
the greatest is, of course, that stated by Mr. Justice Black in the
Adamson case. The Court's judgment under the rule is purely arbitrary
and subjective. It varies from case to case, unrestrained by any measurable standard, according to the Justices' opinion of "fairness" after
their examination of the record. No doubt ·every member of the Court
in reaching his conclusion makes the utmost effort to eliminate any
opinion as to guilt or innocence which the record may have forced into
his mind, but can he ever be certain that this has not entered subconsciously into his determination of "fairness"?
When the Court applies the rule, it is of course converting the
inquiry into one as to the prejudice suffered by the denial of the right,
and is pivoting affirmam:e on the question of the amount of harm done
the accµsed, to use Mr. Justice Roberts' language in Snyder v. Massachusetts.122 Quite apart from the fact that in such an inquiry there may
subconsciously enter considerations of guilt or innocence arising from
United States has potential jurisdiction in all State cases where it is claimed by the
accused that the conviction was based upon his involuntary confession..•.
"The difficult feature of our position rests in the fact that we are called upon to
determine the question from a dual standpoint-first, under the laws and decisions
of this State and second, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. The latter, being conclusions reached by the Court from its examination of
the particular facts of each case, constitute a•precedent or guide only in cases involving
the same fact situations.
"If the Supreme Court would prescribe some formula by which we may be guided,
our task would be much easier.•.."
The lower federal courts and the state courts are similarly burdened by the Rule.
See Hilliard v. Johnston_, (D.C. Cal. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 956; Goodman, "Use and
Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus," 7 F.R.D. 313 at 315 (1947). Criticism from
trial courts would be even more emphatic.
122
291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330 (1934).
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the "independent examination of the record," it must be'"observed that
the doctrine here. applied is one which would be shocking to the framers of our Constitution. The Fair Trial Rule is ·natural law at its
worst; it is subjective judgment unrestrained except by the most
general concept of justice, producing a variable result in each case. 123
The crystallizing process, which in the confessions cases had seemed to
offer hope of reducing the Rule to precise terms, went no further after
Betts v. Brady. The result of the rule in a given case remains by
hypothesis unpredictable.
"The fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions," a phrase used in Hebert
v. Louisiana 124 in a different connection,125 was in the Fair Trial cases
combined with the early cases where due process was found to have
been accorded in form but not in fact, to produce the rule. But this
language was plainly referable to the Constitution (including the Bill
of Rights) and the Declaration of Independence.126 While in the Fair
Trial opinions the phrase has usually been quoted, it is remarkable how
often the objective elements of its last twelve words are omitted in the
more frequent paraphrases. And in particular "liberty" seems somehow to drop out. The phrase is of course far removed from "the
universal sense of justice" or "the common and fundamental ideas of
fairness and right" which Mr. Justice Roberts applied in the Betts
case, and it is by no means the equivalent of "repugnant. to the conscience of mankind," to use Mr. Justice Cardozo's language in the Palko
case. "Universal" is a broad word, even if it is confined to this planet.
So confined, we must recognize, however regretfully, that the universal sense of justice literally would not include notice or hearing, nor
exclude torture or unmentionable mutilation. Confine it, as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter is now attempting,121 to "the notions of justice of Englishspeaking peoples" (however odd these "notions" may be), and it is still
so broad as to be meaningless, for the American Revolution was fought
because of a difference of opinion as to these "notions of justice." Confine
128
Cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942), with Rice v. Olson,
3 24 U.S. 786, 6 5 S.Ct. 989 ( I 945), as to the crime, the punishment and the result.
124
272 U.S. 312 at 316, 47 S.Ct. 103 (1926).
125
It was used in denying a claim that a state court's alleged error in construction
of a state statute amounted to a denial of due process. See note 8 I, supra, as to the
origin of the phrase.
126
As to interpreting the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, see Gulf Colo. & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 at 160, 17 S.Ct.
255 (1897).
127
In his concurring opinions in the Malinski and Adamson cases.
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it to the United States, and many of these cases, as Brown v. Mississippi,128 show how widely these "notions" vary. Confine it to a single
state, and we find in Massachusetts some disagreement as to the fairness of the convictions of Sacco and Vanzetti. Confine it to the Court,
and we find that what shocks the sense of justice of one judge fails
to shock that of another-hence the dissents in many of these cases.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter answered this suggestion in the Malinski
and Adamson cases by saying that the fact that judges might differ
among themselves as to whether a particular trial offended "accepted
notions of justice" did not disprove "that general rather than idiosyncratic standards were applied." 129 But no matter how justices may try
to apply "general standards," and no matter how well they may think
they are succeeding, the result of applying these "notions of justice" is
bound to be idiosyncratic. Mr. Justice Frankfurter also says that an
"alert deference" to the judgment of the state court is "an important
safeguard" against "merely individual judgment"; but this, if it means
anything, means that the rule is not to be applied effectively at all, for
the state court's "fairness" is what, by hypothesis, is to be examined.
It seems evident that what the phrase really means ( excluding such
"alert deference") is the particular notions of the particular Justice in
the particular case, with no objective point of reference whatever. It
is, in short, the purest arid most absolute form of arbitrary and uncontrolled power, a retreat into the deepest jungle of natural law, from
the clearing which the Bill of Rights has created.
The "vague contours" of the due process clause, of which Mr.
Justice Holmes spoke,130 were never so vague as those of the Fair
Trial Rule. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's most recent answer 131 to this is
that if the rule allows too much room for "individual notions of policy," that is not the Court's concern, for the duty of adjudication on
this broad basis "has been committed to this Court." But this is precisely the answer that the old Court used to make in the liberty of
contract cases, when it struck down state economic and social legislation. The duty has not been committed to the Court except by the
128

297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936).
Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes, "Natural Law," 32 HARV. L. REv. 40 at 41 (1918):
"The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naive state of mind
that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as
something that must be accepted by all men everywhere."
130
In Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 at 568, 43 S.Ct. 394
(1923).
131
In Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 at 466 et seq., 67 S.Ct. 374 (1947).
129
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Court itself. The inclusion of the Fair Trial Rule is quite as much
an expansion of the due process clause as would be the inclusion of the
Bill of Rights. The rule is the more shocking because this objective
and precise alternative has been and is still available.
"The Constitution," thundered Erskine to Lord Mansfield,
"never intended to invest Judges with a discretion which cannot
be tried and measured by the plain and palpable standard of
law.... On a special verdict for murder the life of the prisoner
does not depend on the religious, moral or philosophical ideas of
the Judges .... If he is condemned . . . his conduct is brought to
a precise, clear, intelligible standard, and cautiously measured by
it: it is the law therefore, and not the Judge, which condemns

him ...." 132
This was said of another constitution, of trial judges, and-it must
be confessed-in the Eighteenth Century. But one would suppose that
to us, who in the Twentieth have seen the end result of arbitrary power
in the concentration camps of Germany and Russia, it would have still
some force. The rights of the accused must be defined specifically for
precisely the same reason that the elements of the crime must be defined. As the Court (through Mr. Justice Matthews) said long ago:
"When we consider the nature and theory of our institutions
of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to
rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the
play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power." 133
Let us consider next the desire of Justices Murphy and Rutledge
to include the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, but to
retain the Fair Trial Rule as a supplement to, rather than a substitute
for, the Bill of Rights. It is a persuasive suggestion to one who does
not forget that in these cases life or liberty depends upon the decisions.
But it is still arbitrary power, and moreover it is delusive. In which
of the twenty-five or more cases in which the Fair Trial Rule has
been applied has it voided a conviction which would not have been
voided by either the Bill of Rights or procedural due process? None
will be found. Indeed, in the cases where the Fair Trial Rule has
132

Argument in the King's Bench in the Dean of St. Asaph's Case (1784). I
Ridgway ed., 331 (1813).
133
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 at 369, 6 S.Ct. 1064 (1886).
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voided a conviction it has often done so only by the support of the
Bill of Rights bloc,134 a majority of the Fair Trial adherents being opposed to the result. When in Feldman v: United States,135 a federal
prosecution, Mr. Justice Black attempted to use the rule to supplement
the privilege against self-incrimination, he met with the failure that
might have been e},._'Pected. Considering this, and considering also the
reasons why Justices Black- and Douglas, originally among the most
enthusiastic in their application of the rule, have now turned against
it, it would seem that the suggestion is unfortunate.
It seems unlikely that the Fair Trial Rule can contain much
longer the rising tide of liberty, which, since Betts v. Brady, it has
been used to dam and divert. The alternatives to it-there are several
-therefore demand comprehensive consideration. In this consideration it should be remembered that Madison and the First Congress
never intended to guarantee a fair trial in criminal prosecutions simply
by "due process." That was guaranteed, they thought, chiefly by the
specific rights protected in the Bill of Rights. The sum of these, plus
procedural due process, were the essential elements of a fair trial. The
fact that a specific right was included in the Bill of Rights ought there. fore to strengthen its claim for inclusion in the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than· prejudice it, as it has sometimes seemed to do.
Consideration should include also some analysis of the position of
the leading proponent of the rule, Mr. Justice Frankfurter. His objection to the inclusion of the rights of the accused in the due process
clause of ·course does not stem ·from any lack of appreciation of the
value of these rights-on the contrary, his great devotion to them has
often been demonstrated.136 And it ~11 be observed that in his Malin134 Their compromises with the Fair Trial Rule seem, as a matter of hindsight,
to have been unfortunate. More rapid progress in the long run might have been made
by sticking to the Bill of Rights propositions.
185
322 U.S. 487 at 494-495, 64 S.Ct. 1082 (1944).
.
· 1 35 See his opinion in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608
(1943), excluding evidence obtained in violation of legal rights, and remarking (at
347): "The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural
safeguards." See also his remark in Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 at 482, 65 S.Ct.
363 (1945): "Nothing is a more fundamental characteristic of a civilized society than
those securities which safeguard a fair trial for one accused of crime"; and his opinion
in Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 at 615, 66 S.Ct. 402 (1946): "In view
of the place of importance that trial by jury has in our Bill of Rights, it is not to be
supposed that Congress intended to substitute the belief of appellate judges in the guilt
of an accused, however justifiably engendered by the dead record, for ascertainment of
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ski, Resweber and Adamson opinions he was most careful to avoid the
deprecation with which Mr. Justice Cardozo spoke of the privilege
against self-incrimination. The consideration which has produced Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's vigorous opinions in these cases seems to be closely related to that which produced his opinions in the flag salute cases
and in the commerce clause cases as well, that is, reluctance to interfere
with the power of the states any more than strict constitutional necessity requires. It is the doctrine of Mr. Justice Holmes again, applied to
state action of a different kind. The doctrine is understandable, but the
result of its application in this field is not. For the Fair Trial Rule
seems to interfere far more with the administration of criminal justice
by the states than would enforcement of the privilege against selfincrimination, of the right to counsel, or of other specific and welldefined rights. The interference is in incalculable directions, affecting
every detail of every trial, over which the Supreme Court now has
unlimited supervision; and the state courts are left without guide or
precedent as to how to proceed.137 On the other hand, state courts
have been entirely willing to apply the specific rights, if the Court
will tell them that the Fourteenth Amendment so requires.138
The alternative to the Fair Trial Rule which Mr. Justice Black
guilt by a jury under appropriate judicial guidance, however cumbersome that process
may be."
Note in particular his dissenting opinion in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145 at 164, 67 S.Ct. 1098 (1947), with regard to the scope and the importance of
the Fourth Amendment: "To find authority for ransacking a home merely from authority for arrest of a person is to give a novel and ominous rendering to a momentous
chapter in the history of Anglo-American freedom."
As to the privilege against self-incrimination and the requirement of a unanimous
verdict by a jury of twelve, he said long ago: "All this preoccupation with the restrictions upon the criminal process due to the privilege against self-crimination and the
requirement of a unanimous verdict by a jury of twelve is largely a deflection of energy
and attention. We are doomed to deep disappointm1rnt if we act on the belief that
ancient experience in these matters is no longer relevant, and look for substantial diminution in crime by departing from the procedural wisdom of the Bill of Rights."
FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 60-61 (1930).
137
See Newman v. State, 148 Tex. Cr. App. 645, 187 S.W. (2d) 559 (1945).
138
When Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S.Ct. 363 ( 1945) and Tomkins
v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 65 S.Ct. 370 (1945), were returned to the Supreme Court
of Missouri for hearing, the Missouri court, which had previously felt obliged to
dismiss the petitions because of Betts v. Brady, promptly took steps, in conjunction with
its Judicial Conference, to formulate a procedure whereby an accused in a felony case
would be provided with counsel unless an intelligent waiver was made; and the record
would show precisely what had transpired. See Special Reports Nos. 3 and 4 of the
Judicial Conference of Missouri; and I Mo. B.J. 73, 87 (1945); 2 Mo. B:J. 17
(1946).
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suggests is to construe all the rights secured by the Bill of Rights to
be "privileges or immunities" within the meaning of that clause of
the Amendment. Thus the battle so long and gallantly fought by
Mr. Justice Harlan 189 is re-opened. Most history is ironic, but the
vein of irony in the history of this clause runs deep. The bestbeloved child of the Reconstruction Congress became the step-child of
the Court; the clause into which the most detailed specifications were
read by Congress, and from which the most was expected, has for
eighty years been denied all except tautological meaning by the
Court.140
Since the evidence of the purpose of this clause is fairly conclusive (not even Mr. Justice Black's long Appendix in the Adamson
case exhausting it m), it is understandable that the battle should be
reopened; but whether this is the wisest method of enforcing the Bill
of Rights against the states seems debatable. While the Bill of Rights
and the due process clause both protect al~ens as well as citizens, if the
privileges or immunities clause were given life it might be interpreted
to run only to "citizens of the United States." Although these seem
words of definition, not of limitation, the possibility of such an interpretation cannot be ruled out. More important, taking the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment by virtue of this clause means
( almost necessarily in view of the Congressional reports and debate on
which the inclusion must be based) that the Bill of Rights must be
included in its entirety. The evidence of the Congressional intention
to include in toto is strong; and in Maxwell v. Dow,142 where a small
part of this was presented, the Court to exclude it had to resort to an
extraordinary theory of interpretation of constitutional amendments,
apparently reserved for this clause alone, and one which seems understandable only as perhaps a delayed reaction to the Court's having
earlier been deceived by misquotation from the Congressional records
139

Justices Bradley, Swaine, Field and Clifford, at least, shared his view. See
the Appendix in the Adamson case.
140 Except that it was given a small and brief vitality in Colgate v. Harvey, 296
U.S. 404, 56 S.Ct. 252 (1935), overruled by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83,
60 S.Ct. 406 ( l 940). Other recent efforts to give it vitality commanded the support
of two Justices in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939), and of four
in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164 (1941).
141 In this connection see 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME CouRT IN UNITE!> STATES
HISTORY 539-541 (1937), for contemporary comment on the Slaughter-House Cases.
142
176 U.S. 581, 20 S.Ct. 448, 494 (1900).
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into believing that "persons" (in the due process and equal protection
clauses) was deliberately used in order to include corporations.143 And
Twining v. New Jersey 144 said no more as to the privileges or immunities clause than that "the weighty arguments" for inclusion of the whole
Bill of Rights could not profitably be examined, "for the question is
no longer open in this court." To a Court which has rightly consid- ·
ered 145 that, when convinced of former error, it is not constrained to
follow precedent, and that this is particularly true in constitutional
questions, where correction depends upon amendment and not upon
legislative action, these cases present no insurmountable difficulty.
But, while the argument for "privileges or immunities" is persuasive, the trouble lies in the thesis itself, which brings one face to
face with the "all or none" argument which has so often been made.
The two chief stumbling blocks in the way of such "all or none" acceptance are, as may have been gathered, the Fifth Amendment's
requirement of grand jury indictment (in the case of "a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime") and the Seventh Amendment's guarantee
of trial by jury in civil cases where the "value in controversy" exceeds
twenty dollars. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has not failed to emphasize
the problems which would now arise from these two requirements.146
His suggestion that the Bill of Rights would imprison state courts in
an "Eighteenth Century strait-jac~et" ( the phrase comes straight from
the Twining case) is not so formidable as it sounds. He is perhaps the
first in forty years to imply that the administration of justice is less
efficient in federal courts than in state; for it is precisely in this "straitjacket" that federal courts function. The states could without doubt
use the same methods by which those courts have found it possible to
avoid the difficulties which might lie in the indictment requirement,1 " '
148
See Graham, "The 'Conspiracy Theory' of the Fourteenth Amendment,"
47 YALE L.J. 371; 48 ibid. 171 (1938); ·FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE
SuPREME CouRT 186-189 (1939); CuRTis, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 274-275
(1947).
144
2II U.S. 78 at 98, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908).
145
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757 (1944).
146
He referred also in the Adamson case to "a trial by jury of twelve in a
criminal case," but that presents no serious difficulty. The quotation from him in note
136, supra, also applies he,;e. In any case it is the Court, not the Bill of Rights, which
has added "of twelve."
147 Rule 7 of Federal Criminal Rules permits prosecution by information if
indictment is waived, and that course is now often followed. See Holtzoff, "New
Federal Criminal Procedure in Operation," 30 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 134 (1946). The
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and in trial by jury in civil cases.148 Legislation would certainly be
required, but the strait-jacket would not be found too tight once
it was· fitted. The greatest problem would consist of the thousands of prisoners who lie in state penitentiaries as the result of
convictions following information rather than indictment. Even that
could perhaps be overcome,149 but, when one adds to the practical difficulties of including these two rights, surmountable though they may be, the
fact that there is very little to be said for their inclusion, it seems probable that a~majority of the Court will continue to have the greatest
reluctance to protect the Bill of Rights in its entirety. At any rate it
seems clear that the Court would more easily-and more wiselyaccept the "selective process," to which Mr. Justice Black referred in
the Adamson case.
.
It is the due process clause which makes the selective process available. In the Twining case Mr. Justice Moody, obviously troubled,
said that "it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by
the first eight Amendments against national action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial
of due process of law." 150 This is very far from being-as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter seemed to suggest in the Adamson case--a basis for the
Fair Trial Rule. It is, indeed, a denial of that concept. What might
be protected by the clause were the "rights," which of course applied
in every case, not merely in such cases as the Court, on a subjective
basis, might select. The passage seems entirely clear as to this and so
is the authority 151 on which Mr. Justice Moody relied, which was the
procedure was criticized in 31 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 62 (1947) as permitting one day
arraignment, trial, conviction and sentence. But it has been held not to violate the
Fifth Amendment. Barkman v. Sanford, (C.C.A. 5th, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 592, cert.
den., Nov. 10, 1947, 16 U.S. LAw WEEK 3148.
148
See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38. This is substantially. the
limitation previously set up by the statutes of many states.
149
This could be controlled if the rule was stated to apply only to the futurea solution which has been suggested in other situations. See Pekelis, "The Case for a
Jurisprudence of Welfare," 6 LAWYERS GUILD REv. 6II at 620 (1946): "Judges
should be able to set aside a precedent for the future only, while still applying the
old law to the case at hand." Cf. Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining
Co., 287 U.S. 358 at 364, 53 S.Ct. 145 (1932); Warring v. Colpoys, 74 App. D.C.
303, 122 F. (2d) 642 (1941); and Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., (D.C.
Mich. 1947) 69 F. Supp. 710 at 721.
150
211 U.S. 78 at 99, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908).
151 Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 266, 17 S.Ct. 581 (1897),
as to which see note 84, supra.
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holding that one of the rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendmentthe guaranty that private property should not be taken for public use
without just compensation-was protected by the due process clause
as a right in all cases, not simply in such cases as it might seem "fair"
to a majority of the Court to afford the protection. In fact, the philosophy of the Court-until Mr. Justice Cardozo came-was always, without exception, that if the right was protected by the due process clause
it was protected in every case and not simply in those cases which, on
examination of the record, might for one reason or another seem to
a majority of the Court to suggest an element of "unfairness" in its
denial. It is on this uniform and objective basis that the First Amendment liberties and other rights have been read into the due process
clause. The distinction is basic, and it was not pointed out in the Adamson case. 152
The manner of inclusion of these liberties and rights also provides
the obvious answer to the argument that if any of the rights of the
accused are enforced against the states, all of them must be. The First
Amendment rights, for example, were not included on an "all or
none" basis, but one at a time, over a period of twenty-two years.
Each stood on its own claims to inclusion, although it is true that the
early inclusions paved the way for the later.
Defending the Fair Trial Rule against the attack that it was subjective, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Adamson case made the point that
selecting certain rights as "indispensable to the dignity and happiness
of a free man" also threw us back to "a merely subjective test." This
is not true of the inclusion of a right in "due process" ( for which objective tests are available), nor would the test for inclusion in "liberty" be quite that which Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggests. And the
element of subjective judgment which is required for the latter is precisely that which was required for the expansion of "liberty" to include
the First Amendment freedoms. The subjective judgment involved in
reaching a determination as to whether a right must necessarily be in152

Mr. Justice Frankfurter approached it there when he said: "If all that is
meant is that due process contains within itself certain minimal standards which are 'of
the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty' [ citing the Palko case], putting upon
this Court the duty of applying these standards from time to time, then we have
merely arrived at the insight which our predecessors long ago expressed." 332 U.S. 19
at 65, 67 S.Ct. 1658 (1947). But to arrive at the suggestion in the Twining case,
"rights secured by the Bill of Rights" must be substantiated for "minimal standards."
These were Madison's "minimal standards."
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eluded in the concept of liberty is certainly much less to be feared than
the exercise of subjective judgment as to the "fairness" of the trial of
each petitioner, from case to case on a variable basis.
Each right should be considered on its own merits, not each trial
on its own merits. The Bill of Rights safeguards the rights of the
accused, not simply to aid a particular individual in a particular trial,
but in order to protect a free society against the excesses of power and
to provide an efficient administration of justice. The rights ought then
to be examined, one at a time, as they come to the Court, with regard
to their inclusion either in "due process" or in "liberty." In the
Twining case the privilege against self-incrimination was excluded from
due process (over Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent) primarily on the
historical basis, Mr. Justice Moody there observing that the practice
of compulsory self-incrimination had existed for four hundred years
after Magna Charta, not beginning to be seriously questioned until the
reign of Charles I, had "gained at least some foothold among·the early
colonists of this country, and was not entirely omitted at trials in England until the eighteenth century." 158 As in Patterson v. Colorado 154
( decided a year earlier) we are in effect told that the Constitution is
to be interpreted not even in terms of 1789, but of a considerably
earlier date--due process is imprisoned in a Seventeenth Century
strait-jack:et.155 On the other hand, if due process in the Fourteenth
Amendment is to be interpreted in terms of 1868, the date of the
adoption of the Amendment, every state then protected the privilege
against self-incrimination. If it is to be interpreted in contemporary
153
2II U.S. 78 at 102, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908). He resorted also to the trial of
Ann Hutchinson in 1637, as Mr. Justice Black points out in the Adamson case. He
further argued (at 109) that as four of the original states when ratifying the Constitution had insisted on incorporating a guaranty against self-incrimination, separately
and in addition to due_ process, the privilege could not then have been considered to
be inhererit in due process. .But this argument may be to the contrary, for the other
nine states may have considered that due process included the privilege.
154
205 U.S. 454, 27 S.Ct. 556 (1907).
155 See Pittman, "The Colonial and Constiru"tional History of the Privilege Against
Self Incrimination in America," 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935), which makes clear the
historical inaccuracies of the Twining opinion. At 774: "The implication to be found
in" the Twining opinion "that the privilege against self-incrimination was never
regarded in England as the constitutional landmark that our own Constitution makers
of 1789 regarded it, seems unjustifiable." At 78 I: "The privilege came to be fairly
well established in the New England Colonies before 1650 and in Virginia shortly
thereafter." It was well established in England by the early 165o's.
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terms, as one might perhaps suppose, every state protects it now,156
although the confessions cases indicate that the protection is not always
enforced.
The inclusion in due process of the right to the appointment of
counsel would be more difficult, as the Betts case suggests. But if this
and other rights for historical or other reasons cannot qualify as due
process, nevertheless they may be found to be essential parts of liberty. The broad expanse of the latter has too often been overlooked in
recent years. It is natural to think of these rights of trial as procedural,
and hence to resort first to due process for their inclusion. But perhaps
a betttr case may be made out for the inclusion in "liberty" of the
rights which have been most insistently clamoring for admission-,
the right to appointment of counsel and the privilege against selfincrimination. The inclusion there may not have precisely the same
effect, for "liberty" is qualified by "without due process," while "due
process" of course does not qualify itself. If, therefore, the right is
included in due process it is an absolute, not subject to qualification as it
would be if included in liberty. But the practical effect is near enough.
Is it possible, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, to conceive of liberty,
as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment against hostile action by the
states, which does not embrace the privilege against self-incrimination,157 or the right of an indigent accused to the appointment pf coun156
The protection of the privilege rests on constitutional provisions in all the
states except New Jersey and Iowa, where it is accorded by statute. Iowa Code (1939)
§§ n267 et seq.; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 2: 97-7. In the Adamson case it was said
that only four states, California, New Jersey, Ohio and Vermont, lacked a prohibition
against comment to the jury on the failure of the accused to testify. The Twining
case, like the Adamson involved not compelled testimony, but only such comment. The
Court [2n U.S. 78 at n4, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908)] said that it assumed "only for the
purpose of discussion" that such comment infringed the privilege, but that "we do
not intend ••• to lend any countenance to the truth of that assumption."
157
As the Court, through Mr. Justice Bradley, said in Boyd v. United States,
n6 U.S. 616 at 631, 633, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1886): "And,any compulsory discovery
by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of his private books, and
papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is
abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power,
but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom ••••
And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and
papers, to be used in evidence against him, is substantially different from compelling
him to be a witness against himself."
Cf. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 at 389-390, 18 S.Ct. 383 (1898): "This

910

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 46

sel when all the machinery of the state is invoked to co·nvict him of
crime? Does not indeed liberty require that the state do as much to
defend the accused who is helpless to defend himself, as it does to
prosecute him? Are not these rights to a considerable number of persons more valuable essentials of liberty than any of the First Amendment rights which guarantee freedoms of no use to them, when they
face death or imprisonment, alone and helpless? "Constitutional law, like
other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances," 158 but the inclusion of these rights in liberty seems to be taking very few. For the
chance of upsetting the balance between federal and state power, which
is apparently undisturbed by the far more powerful and frequent onslaughts of the commerce clause, must certainly here be slight.
As Justices Harlan and Sutherland more than once observed, "liberty" is a word of wide meaning. Under the Fourteenth Amendment
there is no reason why the standard of justice should be lower in state
courts than in federal.
court has never attempted to define with precision the words 'due process of law,' nor is
it necessary to do so in this case. It is sufficient to say that there are certain immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard, as that no man shall be condemned in his person or
property without due notice and an opportunity of being heard in his defence."
158
Mr. Justice Holmes in Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. I at 7, 32'8.Ct. I (1911).

